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ABSTRACT
International trade in apparel and textiles is regulated by a system of bilateral tariffs and quotas
known as the Multifiber Arrangement or MFA.  Using a time series of detailed product-level data
from the United States on the quotas and tariffs that comprise the MFA, we analyze how the MFA
affects the sources and prices of US apparel imports, with a particular focus on the effects on East
Asian exporters during the 1990s.  We show that while a large fraction of US apparel is imported
under binding quotas, there are many quotas that remain unfilled.  We also show that binding quotas
substantially raise import prices, suggesting both quality upgrading and rent capture by exporters.
In contrast, tariffs reduce import prices.  Lastly, we argue that the substantial shift of US apparel
imports away from Asia in favor of Mexico and the Caribbean during the 1990s is only partly due
to discriminatory trade policy: the other reason is an increasing demand for timely delivery that
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Apparel is the archetypal labor-intensive footloose manufacturing
industry.  It is also very distorted by protection.  This protection is unusually
opaque, as world trade in textiles and apparel is heavily influenced by a
complex system of bilateral quotas called the Multifiber Arrangement
(MFA).  Our goal in this paper is to improve our understanding of the extent
and effects of the MFA, making use of a unique dataset on product-level US
import quotas.  We combine the quota data with very detailed data on trade
flows, transport costs, and tariffs, and we focus on the East Asian exporters
who have traditionally supplied the bulk of US apparel imports.  Our
findings include
•  The MFA constrains exporters in East Asia, although many exports are
not subject to binding quotas, especially those from China and Hong
Kong.
•  Trade liberalization during the 1990s helped East Asian exporters to
expand their sales to the US, but hurt them relative to their competitors in
Mexico and Asia.
•  Technological change which led to an increased demand for timely
delivery also hurt East Asia relative to Mexico and the Caribbean.2
•  The MFA raised import prices and transferred many billions of dollars in
quota rents to holders of quota licenses in East Asia and elsewhere.
2. U.S. TRADE POLICY IN APPAREL
A variety of restrictions have long affected trade in textile and apparel
products.  As early as the 1950s, the United States adopted policies intended
to limit the imports of such products.  One of the broadest policies, however,
became effective in 1974.  The MFA established a system of quotas,
negotiated bilaterally, that limited imports of textile and apparel products.
Recently, efforts have been made to liberalize trade in apparel.
Participants in the Uruguay Round of trade talks under the WTO agreed to
phase out the MFA beginning in 1995.  The MFA was replaced by the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) which put in place a system for
gradual elimination of quantitative restrictions.  The ATC incorporated a
series of stages, with phase-outs occurring at the beginning of 1995, 1998,
2002, and 2005, at which time all remaining quotas will be eliminated.
Remaining quotas are progressively enlarged, using agreed-to increasing
growth rates.  The agreement also established a special safeguard
mechanism for protection against surges and a monitoring body to supervise
implementation.  The United States has participated in the MFA phase-out3
process.  Note, however, that when the first stage of quota elimination began
in 1995, the United States was one of only four WTO members that still
maintained import restrictions under the MFA.
1
In addition to agreeing to eliminate quantitative restrictions, the
United States agreed to reduce its tariffs on textile and apparel products.
According to the Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA, a division of the
U.S. Commerce Department that administers the US’s MFA quotas) tariffs
on textile and apparel products were slated to decline from a trade weighted
average of 17.2 percent ad valorem in 1994 to a trade weighted average of
15.2 percent ad valorem in 2004.  The majority of these reductions will be
phased in over the 10 years.
2
Regional liberalization efforts have also affected the degree to which
quantitative restrictions constrain trade.  The main regional agreements
affecting the period which we examine are the Caribbean Basin Initiative/
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBI/CBERA) and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
3  The CBI/CBERA programs,
                                                
1 According to the WTO, the other countries were Canada, the EC, and Norway.  Many
other WTO Members maintained the right to use the transitional safeguard mechanism in
the ATC.  Only nine members were deemed to have integrated 100 percent at the outset.
(WTO 2003)
2 See OTEXA 1995.
3 The Andean Trade Preference Act  (ATPA) was another program that provided benefits
that, in some cases, applied to trade in apparel.  The (ATPA) was signed into law on
December 4, 1991, but excluded many apparel products. More specifically, ineligible4
initially enacted in the mid-1980s, provided preferential treatment for
imports from twenty-four countries in that region.
4  While apparel products
are generally not eligible for CBI/CBERA benefits, apparel assembled in the
Caribbean Basin using U.S.-origin components receives preferential
treatment in the form of easing of quotas and/or reduced duties.  While these
trade preferences clearly affected imports from this region, there were no
major changes to the policy over the time period that we examine.
Prior to the enactment of NAFTA in 1994, Mexico did not receive
trade preferences on apparel exports commensurate with those available to
the CBI countries.
5  The enactment of NAFTA, however, significantly
changed the relative position of CBI countries vis à vis Mexico.  Many
apparel articles not eligible for benefits under CBI/CBERA were scheduled
for a gradual reduction in duties under NAFTA.  Further, provisions for
production-sharing arrangements with Mexico became more advantageous
than those for production-sharing with CBI countries.  (This change in the
                                                                                                                                                
products included, “textile and apparel items subject to textile agreements on the date that
the ATPA took effect.”  In 1996, of total apparel (SIC 238) imports from ATPA
countries, $1.2 million of $6.8 million entered duty-free, and in 1997 $1.2 million out of
$15 million entered duty-free.  In 1995, ATPA countries also became eligible for 9802
benefits.  Assembled apparel items ($185 million with 47 percent U.S.-content value)
accounted for almost 95 percent of the value of U.S. imports from ATPA beneficiaries
under HTS item 9802.00.80 in 2001; the other industrial group with appreciable amounts
was textile mill products ($10 million with 54 percent U.S.-content value).   See
Shelburne (2002).
4 Note that benefits were subject to the countries satisfying certain conditions.5
relative position of Mexico versus the CBI countries can be seen in the
change in tariff incidence by region between 1990 and 1998, as shown in
Figures 5 and 6.)
The differential effect of these preferential agreements on
Mexico/CBI versus Asia should be kept in mind.  However, there were
generally no significant changes in the treatment of CBI countries over this
time, so that NAFTA is the more important element to consider.  Further, in
the section in which we discuss changes in patterns of imports from Asia
versus Mexico/CBI, the tariff and quota data should capture the effects of
the preferential agreements.
3. THE EXTENT OF PROTECTION IN APPAREL
Given this elaborate structure of trade restrictions, it is not surprising
that textiles and apparel have often been characterized as the “bad boy” of
broader efforts to liberalize trade flows.  For example, Michael Finger and
Ann Harrison (1996) write, “Although textiles and apparel account for less
than 2 percent of total employment in the U.S. economy, protecting them
against import competition accounts for 83 percent of the net cost to the U.S.
economy of all import restrictions.”
                                                                                                                                                
5 Pregelj (2000).6
U.S. imports of apparel encounter both tariff and quota protection at
the border.  Data on tariff rates is fairly readily available.  We utilize trade
data on apparel imports, tariffs, and transport costs from CD-ROMS
purchased from the US Commerce Department.  These data are reported at
the 10-digit HS level, which is the finest level of disaggregation available.
Among other things, the data include information on import values, import
quantities, tariffs, transport costs, and source country.
The data suggest a high level of protection in this sector, at least at the
beginning of the 1990s.  Figure 1 shows histograms, weighted by import
values, of tariff rates across all sources of apparel imports.  In 1990 and
1991, about half of US imports paid tariffs of over 16 percent, and virtually
none came in duty-free. There has been some liberalization since the early
1990s.  However, by 1998, high tariffs were much less prevalent, and about
20 percent entered nearly duty free (with tariffs of less than 2 percent).
Information on quota incidence is more difficult to obtain than data on
tariffs.  As a result, analysis evaluating the extent to which the quota system
has restricted imports to the United States has been somewhat limited.
Information on US textile and apparel quotas is maintained by the Office of
Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA) within the Commerce Department.
Working with OTEXA, we have assembled a comprehensive product-level7
time series on the U.S. MFA program.  Quota levels vary by product, year,
and trading partner.  We obtained records on all apparel quotas from 1990 to
1998.  OTEXA uses their own import classification system to administer the
MFA, which has no simple relationship to any other US or international
system of reporting trade data.   The product categories are broken down by
type of fiber (cotton, wool, silk, man-made, and other), and are fairly broad:
categories include "dresses," "sweaters," "underwear," etc..  Using this data,
we are able to examine the extent to which quotas have restricted imports of
apparel and textile.
The most important indicator of a quota’s restrictiveness is its “fill
rate,” defined as the percentage of a quota that is used.  Fill rates that are
much less than 100 percent suggest that the quota is not binding, while
higher fill rates indicate that the quota indeed keeps imports below what they
would otherwise be.  Appendix Table 1 summarizes quota incidence in 1991
and 1998 by commodity.
Figure 2 illustrates the incidence of quotas.  It shows histograms of
quota fill rates across all sources of apparel imports, weighted by import
values, for each of the years in the sample.  If we define a binding quota as
one with a fill rate of 90 percent or above, the figure shows that about 40
percent of US apparel imports came in under binding quotas throughout the8
1990s.
6  One question of interest is whether the gradual liberalization under
the WTO has affected the incidence of quotas.  Many of the required
changes in quota restrictions have been delayed until the very last phase-out
period.  In the case of the United States, nearly 50 percent of the planned
phase-outs will not occur until the final tranche on January 1, 2005. 
7  In
fact, according to the 1998 review of the implementation of the agreement, a
number of countries complained that a vast majority of liberalization in
terms of the value of trade would indeed not occur until the final phases of
the program. 
8  This slow progress on liberalization is reflected in the fact
that there has been little change in the proportion of trade coming in under
binding quotas during this period.  Nevertheless, the fact that much of the
trade is not affected by a binding quota suggests that even the current
restrictions are not as onerous as might have been expected.
Figures 1 and 2 cover all sources of US apparel imports, and are not
necessarily indicative of the barriers facing East Asian exporters.  Figure 3
shows the value of apparel imports from East Asia.  China and Hong Kong
                                                
6 Industry experts define a quota as restrictive or “constraining” if it is filled to between
85 and 90 percent.  Although this level is still below the maximum allowed export limit,
complexities in the quota management system (including complex aggregates) can make
it difficult to completely fill a quota (USITC 2002).  The EU defines quotas 95 percent
filled as constraining. See USITC (2002).
7 See OTEXA Integration.  This is consistent with the liberalization requirements of the
ATC.
8 See WTO (1998).9
are the largest exporters of both constrained and unconstrained imports,
while the smaller exporters (Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and the
Philippines) seem to have their exports very tightly capped by MFA quotas.
Table 1 shows the extent to which quotas have applied to U.S.
imports, and it confirms the visual impression of Figure 2: the share of US
imports coming in under a binding quota did not change much during the
1990s.  It is important to remember that the 1990s were a time of booming
demand in the US, so it may be that expanding quota limits simply kept pace
with growing demand, leaving the equilibrium amount of quota-constrained
trade roughly equal.  Indeed, the import-weighted average binding quota
grew by 10 percent per year over the period.  Table 2 illustrates that there
was substantial liberalization for the major East Asian exporters, with China
and Hong Kong seeing their quota-constrained exports fall by more than 15
percentage points as a share of their total exports, while Taiwan’s quota-
constrained share fell by 25 percentage points.  By contrast, Thailand,
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Korea all found themselves more tightly
constrained in 1998 than they were in 1991.
Figures 2 and 3 and Tables 1 and 2 establish that aggregate US quota
coverage didn’t change much, while the big East Asian exporters saw some
liberalization.  How is this possible?  The answer is Mexico and the10
Caribbean.  Figure 4 shows that the 1990s saw a substantial shift in apparel
import market share away from Asia and toward Mexico and the Caribbean.
This was at least partly due to tariff liberalization that favors these countries
close to the United States, as seen in Figures 5 and 6.  However, as tariffs
were liberalized for Mexico and the Caribbean, Mexico became more
constrained by quotas, as illustrated in Figures 7 and 8.
3. TRADE AND THE DEMAND FOR TIMELINESS
Trade policy in the form of  NAFTA and the Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI) is certainly part of the reason for the market share shifts seen
in Figure 4.  Another explanation, discussed in detail in Evans and Harrigan
(2003), is that an increased demand for timeliness (by which we mean a
short and reliable lag between order and delivery) has affected the pattern of
trade.  In apparel retailing, the demand for timely delivery comes from
fluctuations in demand, and varies by product category.  To measure the
demand for timeliness, we collected data from a major US department store
chain on the percentage of various apparel categories that are subject to
“rapid replenishment,” that is, which are re-ordered continuously throughout
the selling season.  This business strategy was almost unknown in 1990 but11
was in widespread use by the end of the decade.
9  Since rapid delivery is
most profitable from nearby locations, our hypothesis is that imports of
products where rapid replenishment is important have grown
disproportionately from countries near the US.
A possible substitute for proximity is airfreight: imports that are
shipped by air from distant countries can arrive just as quickly as products
shipped by sea or land from nearby countries.  Air freight has gotten much
cheaper over time (see Hummels, 2001), but it remains far more expensive
than other modes, suggesting that only products that have a high ratio of
value to weight (“light” products) can profitably be shipped by air.  If
airfreight is a substitute for proximity, and if airfreight is only profitable for
light products, then we should see that light products have increasingly been
sourced from countries far from the US.
To investigate these hypothesis, we estimated the following equation
on a single long time difference from 1991 to 1998:
12 ic i c ic i c ic c mr d v d µ µα τβ β ∆=++ ∆ + +              (1)
where the µ’s are product and country fixed effects and
∆mic = growth in imports in product i from country c
∆τic = change in ad-valorem trade barriers
                                                
9 See Abernathy et al (1999).12
ri = percent of products in category i subject to rapid replenishment
dc = indicator equal to 1 for countries close to the US (Mexico,
Caribbean, Canada)
vic = value-to-weight ratio of product i from country c in last year of
sample.  Larger values of vic correspond to lighter products.
The hypotheses are that β1 > 0 and β2 <0: products where replenishment is
important, and products that are heavy, grew more rapidly from nearby
countries.  We test this hypothesis using only observations where quotas
were not binding, and the results are given in Table 3 (which is closely
related to results in Harrigan and Evans (2003); see that paper for more
details, data description, and sensitivity analysis).  The proximity-
replenishment effect β1 is about one, with a t-statistic of 3.  How big is this
effect?  Since the range of the replenishment variable is between 0 and 67
percent, an estimated β of 1.04 implies that high-replenishment products
from nearby countries grew 1.04×67 = 70 percentage points faster than
otherwise.  This is a big effect: it is more than 2.5 times faster than the mean
level of bounded growth, and almost half again as fast as median growth.
For products where replenishment is less important, with a replenishment
percentage of 25 percent, the estimates still imply a big proximity effect,13
with imports growing 26 percentage points faster from nearby countries than
more remote sources.  The replenishment-proximity effect is also large
relative to the effects of protection: the estimated parameters imply that, for
high-replenishment products, proximity to the US is equivalent to a 53
percentage point reduction in tariffs, while for goods with a replenishment
percentage of 25 percent proximity is equivalent to a 20 percentage point
tariff reduction.
The effect of weight is also large.  The standard deviation of the
value-weight ratio is 230; multiplying this by the estimated β2 means that
imports of light products grew -0.132*230 = 30 percentage points more
slowly from nearby than from faraway countries.
4. THE EFFECT OF PROTECTION ON IMPORT PRICES
We have shown that both trade policy and geography have had an
important effect on the pattern and volume of trade in apparel.  We now turn
to the effect of US trade policy on the prices of apparel imports.  With two
or more competing exporters, a key parameter is the degree of
substitutability in the importer’s demand between the products of the
different exporters.  We consider a few simple cases here, as a guide to
empirical work.14
The simplest model that is relevant to the MFA is one where there are
two exporters, only one of whom faces a binding quota, and whose exports
are perfect substitutes in the importer’s demand.  The situation is illustrated
in Figure 9.
The import demand curve facing two exporting countries A and B is
given by m(p).  A has lower costs cA < cB, so that in the absence of trade
restrictions all imports would be from A.  However, a quota has been placed
on imports from A, mA ≤ Q. As a result, the world price is determined by cost
in B, p = cB, with exporters in A earning a rent per unit equal to the cost
difference.
10  The quota binds, with mA = Q and mB = m(cB)- Q .
An interesting thing about this little model is that it implies that,
across a group of exporting countries, there need be no relationship between
unit value and a binding quota: the two countries charge the same price even
though one is bound by a quota and the other is not.  Furthermore, any
change in the level of the quota will have no effect on price, as long as Q ≤
m(cB); beyond that point, B’s market share goes to zero and any further
quota relaxation leads to a fall in price as the equilibrium moves down the
demand curve.
                                                
10 Technical point: the importer is indifferent between buying from A or B at any price, so
assume an infinitesimally lower price from A to close the model.15
What if imports from A and B are imperfect substitutes?  This case is
illustrated in the two panels of Figure 10. A relaxation of the quota
constraint on A leads to lower prices on imports from A, which in turn shifts
the demand curve facing exporters in B.  Depending on the elasticities of
demand in the two markets, and the elasticity of supply in B, relative prices
of A and B exports can rise, fall, or stay the same.  A useful benchmark is
one where the own-elasticity of demand is the same, while the cross
elasticity is less than the own-elasticity: in this case, the shift down in B’s
demand curve is less than the fall in the price facing A.  This implies that the
equilibrium price of imports from A will fall relative to the price of imports
from B when the quota on A is relaxed.  In the cross-section, then, binding
quotas will be associated with higher prices.  Note however, that the
equilibrium price difference across exporters depends on many structural
parameters of demand and supply that are impossible to estimate without a
great deal of information.
What about non-binding quotas?  In most models unfilled quotas will
have no effect, and the equilibrium is the same as one with no quotas at all.
This theoretical discussion suggests a simple reduced-form model for
the effect of quotas on import prices:16
12 3 ln ln(1 ) ln(1 ) ict i c t ict ict ict ict p fillrate binding α ααβ τ β β ε =+++ + + + + +   (2)   
In equation (2), the α’s are product, country, and year fixed effects.  The
slope coefficients β measure the effects of
τict  ad-valorem trade barriers, including tariffs and transport costs
fillrateict the proportion of a quota which is used.  By definition, the fill
rate for flows not subject to a quota is zero (since the implicit
quota is infinite).
bindingict A dummy variable equal to 1 if the quota is binding.
A drawback of (2) is that it imposes constant coefficients across products
and years.  Our data has enough cross-sectional variability to make year-by-
year estimation feasible, so we also estimate
12 3 ln ln(1 ) ln(1 ) ict it ct t ict t ict t ict ict p fillrate binding α αβ τ β β ε =++ + + + + + (3)
While equations (2) and (3) are non-structural, theory does give some
suggestions about the interpretation of the slope coefficients.  β1 summarizes
how f.o.b. import prices respond to ad-valorem trade barriers, and is
expected to be negative to the extent that the US has market power.  If non-
binding quotas don’t have any effect, β2 is likely to be zero, given that the
effect of binding quotas is measured by β3.17
A problem with estimating (2) and (3) is that we do not have true
price data and must make do with unit values instead.  Unit values are
constructed from the raw data by dividing the value of shipments by the
physical quantity of imports (usually measured by “dozens” in the case of
apparel).  Unit values in a given category can differ across exporters even if
identical goods have identical prices everywhere, to the extent that the
composition of exports within a category differs by source country.  The
theory of “quality upgrading” suggests that binding quotas induce higher
unit values, in which case β3 > 0 may measure quality differences rather than
quota rents.
11
Table 4 shows the results of estimating equations (2) and (3).  We
report both OLS and weighted least squares estimates, with the weights
given by import values.  We focus here on the WLS results.
The column headed “barriers” suggests that the US does indeed have
market power in apparel, with a significantly negative elasticity of import
prices with respect to ad-valorem barriers in most years.  Interestingly, the
effect seems to have declined over time, with an elasticity of -0.5 at the
beginning of the sample and only -0.06 by 1998.
                                                
11 See Feenstra 2004, Chapter 8.18
Binding quotas had a sizable impact on prices, with an overall effect
of 6.3 percentage points.  Between 1990 and 1996, the quota effect was on
the order of 5-10 percentage points, an effect which jumped to 24 in the
“Asia Crisis” year of 1997 before becoming slightly negative in the recovery
year of 1998.  This anomalous behavior may be due to the fact that two of
the largest quota-constrained exporters, China and Hong Kong, did not
devalue in 1997, while other countries did.
Controlling for whether or not a quota is binding, the fill rate has no
effect, as shown in the first row of Table 4.  For clarity in reporting, we
excluded the fill rate as a regressor in the year-by-year regressions.
12
Our results suggest that effect of quotas on prices is a step function:
for fill rates between zero and 90 percent the effect is zero, and for fill rates
above 90 the effect is constant.  This is the right specification only if quotas
bind precisely when fill rates hit 90 percent but not before or after.  To check
this we estimated versions of equation (2) that included dummies for fill
rates in the intervals [80,85), [85,90), [90,95), and [95,100].  The results
suggests that quotas start to bind at fill rates of around 85 percent, and that
                                                
12 This result is not surprising, but it does cast doubt on the results of Krishna and Tan
(1998). They find a positive effect of fill rate on import prices, but fail to control for
whether the quota is binding.19
the price effect is constant between 85 percent and 100 percent.
13 However,
the results from assuming that quotas bind at a fill rate of 85% are not
materially different from the results reported in Table 4.
What do these results imply about the level of quota rents?  It is
impossible to answer this question with any confidence, since our statistical
model is non-structural, but a back of the envelope calculation is instructive.
Using the overall WLS binding quota effect of 6.3 percent, and multiplying
by the aggregate quantity of quota-constrained imports between 1990 and
1998 ($106.5 billion), gives an estimate of quota rents of $6.71 billion.  This
is almost surely a lower bound on the cost of the MFA for US apparel
consumers, since the elimination of quotas would likely reduce world prices.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The 1990s had both good and bad news for East Asian apparel
exporters.  Their overall exports to the US increased, at least partly due to
trade liberalization in the form of reduced tariffs and expanded quotas.  But
both discriminatory trade policy (NAFTA and the CBI) and technological
change (which made proximity to the US market more valuable) conspired
                                                
13 In particular, the coefficient on the indicator for the [80,85) interval is insignificantly
different from zero, while the other intervals are all significantly positive.  In addition, an20
against East Asia, leading to a loss of market share to Mexico and the
Caribbean.  As trade continues to liberalize, trade policy may cease to be an
advantage for exporters near the US market, but their geographical
advantage will persist.  This suggests that even when the MFA is finally
phased out, trade patterns are unlikely to return to where they were before
NAFTA and the CBI.
 The MFA continued to substantially distort trade even after the
founding of the WTO.  We find that MFA quotas tightly constrained many
East Asian exporters, and led to substantially higher import prices in the US.
A rough calculation suggests that MFA quotas yielded many billions of
dollars in quota rents to holders of quota licenses.
                                                                                                                                                
F-test fails to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the [85,90), [90,95), and
[95,100] intervals are equal.21
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Figure 3- US apparel imports from East Asia, 1990-98Table 1 - US apparel imports from all sources
Unrestricted Non-binding quota Binding quota
1990 39 20 41
1991 27 21 52
1992 27 22 51
1993 30 27 42
1994 30 23 47
1995 27 37 36
1996 27 41 32
1997 28 27 45
1998 33 23 44
Notes to Table 1: Unrestricted imports face no quota. A non-binding quota is
defined as having a fill rate between 0 and 90, and binding quotas have fill
rates of at least 90 percent.
Table 2 - Quota incidence in East Asia
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Notes to Table 3: all regressions include country and product fixed
effects. Sample is observations not constrained by quotas (N = 2,753).
t-statistics in italics.  Dependent variable is bounded import growth
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p2Table 4 - Price effects
OLS Weighted LS
barriers Quota fill rate barriers quota fill rate
1990-98 -0.241 0.102 0.000 -0.016 0.063 -0.003
-29.0 5.1 0.0 -2.7 14.2 -1.9
1990 -0.395 0.205 -0.504 0.108
-11.2 3.1 -8.5 7.5
1991 -0.302 0.104 -0.212 0.053
-10.4 2.0 -3.9 4.0
1992 -0.235 0.097 -0.390 0.054
-8.1 1.8 -9.2 4.2
1993 -0.211 0.133 -0.343 0.065
-9.1 2.4 -11.9 5.0
1994 -0.266 0.159 -0.179 0.096
-10.4 3.0 -7.8 6.6
1995 -0.303 0.057 -0.182 0.076
-11.2 1.1 -7.9 5.5
1996 -0.257 0.080 -0.062 0.088
-9.1 1.5 -2.9 6.2
1997 -0.264 0.115 0.010 0.242
-9.6 2.2 0.5 18.5
1998 -0.264 0.129 -0.060 -0.034
-10.6 2.6 -2.8 -2.5
Notes to Table 4: Dependent variable is log unit value of imports into United
States, by exporter, product, and year.  See text for definitions of regressors.
All regressions include exporter and product fixed effects, and first row
regressions include year fixed effects.  For weighted least squares, the











M&B Knit Shirts, Cotton 338 66 58 10.7
M&B Cot. Trousers/Breeches/Shorts 347 56 35 10.4
W&G Cotton Trousers/Slacks/Shorts 348 63 30 8.4
W&G Knit Shirts/Blouses, Cotton 339 48 60 7.4
M&B Cotton Shirts, Not Knit 340 71 54 6.4
W&G Mmf Knit Shirts & Blouses 639 64 86 4.9
Other M&B Mmf Coats 634 79 43 3.5
W&G Mmf Coats 635 54 28 3.2
M&B Mmf Trousers/Breeches/Shorts 647 69 64 3.1
M&B Mmf Knit Shirts 638 55 70 3
W&G Cot. Shirts/Blouses,N-Knit 341 47 71 2.6
Mmf Dresses 636 59 32 2.6
W&G Mmf Slacks/Breeches/Shorts 648 66 62 2.3
Other Mmf Apparel 659 38 22 2.3
Other Cotton Apparel 359 46 17 1.8
W&G Not-Knit Mmf Shirts & Blouses 641 60 43 1.8
W&G Sweaters, Wool 446 64 56 1.6
W&G Mmf Sweaters 646 6 47 1.6
W&G Wool Coats 435 29 11 1.5
Mmf Skirts 642 30 40 1.4
Sweaters, Other Non-Cot Veg Fibers 845 85 73 1.3
Cotton Sweaters 345 49 68 1.2
M&B Not-Knit Mmf Shirts 640 38 27 1.1
Cotton Dresses 336 47 51 1
W&G Not-Knit Silk Shirts&Blouses 741 0 0 1
Mmf Hosiery 632 48 0 0.9
W&G Silk Knit Shirts & Blouses 739 0 0 0.9
M&B Suit-Type Coats, Wool 433 5 6 0.8
Cotton Hosiery 332 12 2 0.7
Wool Knit Shirts/Blouses 438 3 61 0.7
M&B Sweaters, Wool 445 27 43 0.7
Trousers/Breeches/Shorts, Silk&Veg 847 67 56 0.7
Cotton Skirts 342 31 32 0.6
M&B Wool Trousers/Breeches/Shorts 447 19 8 0.6
W&G Wool Slacks/Breeches/Shorts 448 31 14 0.6
Non-Knit Shirts & Blouses, Silk&Veg 840 24 43 0.6W&G Cotton Coats 335 46 26 0.5
W&G Silk Coats 735 0 0 0.4
Silk Dresses 736 0 0 0.4
Knit Shirts & Blouses, Silk & Veg 838 30 37 0.4
Other M&B Coats, Cotton 334 48 16 0.3
Wool Skirts 442 31 12 0.3
M&B Mmf Suit-Type Coats 633 19 10 0.3
M&B Mmf Sweaters 645 3 17 0.3
M&B Mmf Down-Filled Coats 653 58 71 0.3
Silk Skirts 742 0 0 0.3
W&G Silk Trousers/Breeches/Shorts 748 0 0 0.3
W&G Coats, Silk & Veg Blends 835 69 37 0.3
Dresses, Silk & Veg Blends 836 0 62 0.3
Other M&B Wool Coats 434 3 2 0.2
Other Wool Apparel 459 22 19 0.2
W&G Mmf Down-Filled Coats 654 64 77 0.2
Silk Neckwear 758 0 0 0.2
Skirts, Silk & Veg. Blends 842 5 9 0.2
M&B Suit-Type Coats, Cotton 333 33 1 0.1
Wool Dresses 436 61 3 0.1
M&B Silk Knit Shirts 738 0 0 0.1
M&B Not-Knit Silk Shirts 740 0 0 0.1
W&G Silk Sweaters 746 0 0 0.1
M&B Silk Trousers/Breeches/Shorts 747 0 0 0.1
Other Silk Apparel 759 0 0 0.1
M&B Suit-Type Coats, Silk & Veg 833 3 1 0.1
Sweaters, Silk Blends 846 5 2 0.1
Other Silk & Non-Cot. Veg Apparel 859 43 24 0.1
M&B Down-Filled Coats 353 75 72 0
W&G Down-Filled Coats 354 77 88 0
Wool Hosiery 432 1 2 0
Wool Shirts/Blouses, Not-Knit 440 10 5 0
M&B Suit-Type Silk Coats 733 0 0 0
Other M&B Silk Coats 734 0 0 0
M&B Silk Sweaters 745 0 0 0
Hosiery, Silk & Veg Blends 832 1 2 0
Other M&B Coats, Silk & Veg 834 55 51 0
Neckwear, Silk & Veg Blends 858 0 0 0
*Note on abbreviations: M&B – Men and Boys, W&G- Women and Girls, Mmf- Man made fiber.